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An Awareness of What Is Missing:
Four Views on the Consequences of Secularism
Rachel Hunt-Steenblik, Heidi Zameni, Debbie Ostorga, and Nathan Greeley
Claremont Graduate University
Abstract
While the issues regarding widespread secularization in contemporary Western culture are
difficult to properly assess, it can be argued that certain prerequisites are necessary for the wellbeing of any society and, furthermore, that certain of these necessary conditions are only
provided by a given civilization's major religious tradition. All societies need to perpetually
engage in collective action and decision making, and as any given community faces the
challenges of the future, its governing religious worldview is an indispensable source of
guidance and time-honored wisdom. With this in mind, it will be argued that Western civilization
is dependent upon a Judeo-Christian orientation for its ongoing vibrancy, integrity, and
sustainability as a culture. When the background of shared values and norms provided by
Judaism and Christianity no longer functions in any unifying capacity, society loses its sense of
identity and purpose, and impoverishment in many areas of human life and endeavor is felt and
observed. Something—whether it is described as value, order, meaning, community, or charity—
goes missing. This diminishment will be analyzed with respect to four different Western fields of
study: philosophy, literature, politics, and education.
______________________________________________________________________________

It can be argued that certain prerequisites are necessary for the well-being of any society, and
that certain of these necessary conditions are only provided by a society's major religious
tradition. All societies engage in collective action and decision making, and, as any given society
faces the challenges of the future, its governing religious worldview is an indispensable source of
guidance and time-honored wisdom. It will be argued in the four sections of this paper that
Western civilization is dependent upon a Jewish-Christian orientation for its ongoing vibrancy,
integrity, and sustainability. As a corollary, when the background of shared values and norms
provided by Judaism and Christianity no longer functions in any unifying capacity, the society
dependent on those values and norms loses its sense of identity and purpose, and
impoverishment in many areas of human life and endeavor is felt and observed. Something—
whether it is described as value, order, meaning, community, or charity—goes missing.
In the following, this loss will be analyzed with respect to four different areas of modern
Western society. Engaging with Jürgen Habermas and some of his interlocutors, Rachel Hunt
Steenblik will discuss in the first section how politics needs religion to provide the pre-political
assumptions that make a successful politics possible. The second section will feature an analysis
by Heidi Zameni of the ways in which the teaching of literature is adversely affected when
religious understanding and religious values are excluded as tools of interpretation and
assessment. In the third section, Debbie Ostorga will comment on the changing sense of purpose
governing the increasingly secularized university. For centuries universities were institutions
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committed to preserving and promoting the highest values and ideals of Western society; today
universities are often drearily practical in their focus. The moral vision has flown. Lastly, Nathan
Greeley will attempt to show why morality is not, properly speaking, morality without God.
Rachel Hunt-Steenblik — An Awareness of What is Missing in the Political Sphere
In An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, renowned
philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and others, consider what reason is missing when faith is absent,
particularly in the political sphere. They recognize that secular society’s tendency to handily
dismiss faith in praise of reason is no longer sufficient for our post-secular society. Indeed, these
thinkers see a “renewed visibility of religion” that must be accounted for (Reder and Schmidt 1).
While religious institutions have changed during the “modern and postmodern eras...they
nevertheless remain a phenomenon of major social importance” (1). This is especially evident in
western societies, where the influence of religion is persistently found in the political domain, in
political conversations, as well as in the more quotidian social domain. Consequently, religion
retains its social significance, which in turn adds to its political significance.
It becomes important to ask what role religion has in these societies, for citizens of
various religions, or for those who consider themselves non-religious. This question takes on
even greater weight for those concerned with “society as a whole,” and have noticed that religion
does play a social role (4).
Much of Habermas’s discussion concerns the discursive relationship between reason and
faith, and what he perceives as a deeply troubling gap in the interlocutors’ discourse. Within this
framework, he extends tailored invitations to both secular and spiritual persons. Reason is
challenged to reflect upon itself, and consider precisely what it is missing in relation to faith. It is
also invited to remember its shared history with religion (manifested, in part, from Augustine to
Thomas). Faith, on the other hand, is called to “translate the contents of religious language into a
secular one and thus...make them accessible to all” (7). Both “partners in the dialogue” are
invited to be charitable to the other, and take one another seriously, “in particular regarding their
core convictions” (14). Only then may they enter into a genuine discourse which can benefit
whole societies and states.
When Habermas speaks of reason in terms of what is missing, he alludes to a particular
kind of deficiency. Reason does not lack something that it cannot have, but “something which it
could have but does not and which it painfully misses” (Brieskorn 26). This something that is
primarily lost and needs to be recovered is none other than the human element: “Among the
modern societies, only those that are able to introduce into the secular domain the essential
contents of their religious traditions which point beyond the merely human realm will also be
able to rescue the substance of the human” (Habermas, Politik 142). This may be because
humans are endowed with more than brains, minds, and logic; they are also endowed with hearts,
feelings, and intuition.
A reason that reflects “on the religious” is not only capable of recovering the essentially
human: it can also develop a more accurate understanding of history. Likewise, faith elucidates
that history is interwoven with a religious element, and that no world or local history would be
complete without inclusion of the sacred in the lives of its people. Religion is intimately and
inextricably tied to the world’s events, as well as to the world’s ideas, so much so that we are
unable to comprehend the “central concepts of the history of ideas” if we ignore that they arose
in many instances from “religious convictions” (Reder and Schmidt 5).
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Still, this precursory understanding is not enough. “In addition to this historical
knowledge,” philosophy should learn that religions “maintain indispensable semantic elements
which differ fundamentally from” itself “and which may be important for the just ordering of
modern societies” (4-5). Welcoming faith into the public and political spheres can help aid
reason in this “just ordering.”
It becomes clear that faith and knowledge “stand in a reciprocal relation” (6). Each are
needed in responding to society’s most pressing “social questions such as those posed by
bioethics.” Religion “proves to be an important moral resource in this context,” for religious
citizens are able to ‘justify moral questions’ in a way that pure reason is not. Indeed, they possess
unique “access to a potential” for delineating these crucial queries (6). The “meaning endowing
function” of religion contributes a moral foundation for public dialogue and therefore plays an
essential role in “the public sphere” (6).
Moreover, a democracy depends on many things that cannot be legislated or commanded.
Among these are “moral stances” arising from “pre-political sources,” including religious modes
of living. All majority decisions made in democracies rely on the “prior ethical convictions of
their citizens.” This is true in part because each participant enters the political sphere carrying
previously acquired ideologies and beliefs. It is neither preferable nor possible for politics to
separate citizens from their preconceived moral intuitions. Indeed, these pre-political sources act
in two important functions, first, “for democracy as a background,” and second, as a strong
“source of motivation,” even though they are unable to serve as ‘normative guidelines for the
democratic’ process (7).
Habermas explains this further in a discussion with Pope Benedict XVI:
Citizens are expected to make active use of their rights to communication and to
participation, not only in what they rightly take to be their own interests, but also with an
orientation to the common good. This demands a more costly commitment and
motivation, and these cannot simply be imposed by law. For example, in a democratic
constitutional state, a legal obligation to vote would be just as alien as a legal requirement
to display solidarity. All one can do is suggest to the citizens of a liberal society that they
should be willing to get involved on behalf of fellow citizens whom they do not know
and who remain anonymous to them and that they should accept sacrifices that promote
common interests.
This is why both political and moral virtues “are essential if democracy is to exist” (Habermas
and Ratzinger, 30).
Modern reason understands “the universalistic and egalitarian concepts of morality and
law which shape the freedom of the individual and interpersonal relations” (Habermas, “An
Awareness” 18). Nevertheless, the choice to “engage in action based on solidarity when faced
with threats which can be averted only by collective effort calls for more than insight into good
reasons” (18-19). Only religion preserves the images “of the moral whole... as collectively
binding ideals,” thus demonstrating the greatest limitation of practical reason (19).
This same reason “fails to fulfill its own vocation when it no longer has sufficient
strength to awaken, and to keep awake, in the minds of secular subjects, an awareness of the
violations of solidarity throughout the world,” what Habermas describes as “an awareness of
what is missing,” and “of what cries out to heaven” (19). What is needed is a “mode of
legitimation founded on convictions,” as well as the “support of reasons which can be accepted

3

LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University, Vol. 3 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
Hunt-Steenblik, Zameni, Ostorga & Greeley 4

in a pluralistic society by religious citizens, by citizens of different religions, and by secular
citizens alike” (20).
Religion is called upon to open up its content, to “recognize for reasons of its own the
neutrality of the state towards world-views, the equal freedom of all religious communities, and
the independence of the institutionalized sciences” (21). The state should not require its citizens
to “split their existence into public and private parts, for example by obliging them to justify
their stances in the political arena” purely “in terms of non-religious reasons” (21). First, there is
always a blurring between a person’s motivations, making any division artificial at best. Second,
a religious person should be allowed to be religiously motivated, even in the political realm.
As stated by Habermas, religiously “justified stances” should be granted “a legitimate
place in the public sphere,” manifesting that the “political community officially recognizes that
religious utterances can make a meaningful contribution to clarifying controversial questions of
principle” (22). Religious persons become responsible for making their utterances
understandable in “a publicly accessible language.” They must also accept the “authority of
‘natural’ reason as the fallible results of the institutionalized sciences and the basic principles of
universalistic egalitarianism in law and morality” (16). Secular persons become responsible “not
to treat religious expressions as simply irrational. Further, “secular reason may not set itself up as
the judge concerning truths of faith, even though in the end it can accept as reasonable only what
it can translate into its own, in principle universally, accessible, discourses” (22; 16).
As both reason and faith reflect upon the limits of their own positions, needed learning
and communication can take place. This allows the two distinct sides to speak “with one
another” rather than “merely about one another,” which Habermas perceives as a profound
difference (16). The most essential thing, for Habermas, is that human beings “foster a
willingness to communicate” together “on the basis of a reason that unites them and possesses
authority for them” (Reder and Schmidt 10). Language and discourse become the keys. The
French philosopher, Emanuel Levinas, pointed out that it is through language that we are able to
have relationships of peace, where neither party is absolved into the other, but can remain
absolute, Habermas reveals that it is through language that neither faith nor reason are
assimilated into the other. Reason, if reasonable enough, will engage with faith to promote
political peace and unity in the public sphere, and will foster the “motivation to show solidarity”
that comes so easily to religion (Brieskorn 29). Reason, rightly applied, will also develop a better
understanding of history, and rescue the essentially human.
Heidi Zameni — Prose without a Soul: The Secularization of Literary Studies
Until recently, literature and religion have enjoyed a comfortable relationship.
Throughout the history of Western civilization, literature was an important aspect of an
education. Precepts and moral guides were written into stories, poetry, and dramas, in order to
reinforce society’s common values. The Old Testament, the Greek and Norse myths, the
Bhagavad Gita, and other early works indicate that the original authors and the intended
audiences thought less about the literary value of their texts and more about their religious worth
(Tennyson and Ericson 9). In Thomas Carlyle’s 1841 seminal collection of orations On Heroes,
Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, he explains the importance of the “Man of Letters”: “I
many a time say, the writers of Newspapers, Pamphlets, Poems, Books, these are the real
working effective Church of a modern country. . . . How much more [the writer], who says, or in
any way brings home to our heart the noble doings, feelings, darings and endurances of a brother
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man! He has verily touched our hearts as with a live coal from the altar. Perhaps there is no
worship more authentic” (188). Later on during the same lectures, Carlysle reemphasizes the
point: “Books are our Church too” (189). For Carlyle and others of his day, literature offered a
spiritual light mirroring a religious perspective.
Literature has long since lost that primacy. Our increasingly naturalistic-oriented society
has secularized our approach to the study and discussion of literature. We are an academy which
revels in man’s ability to create meaning through statistics, facts, textual analysis—scientifically
verifiable data—instead of a metaphysical pursuit of knowledge. The idea that there could be any
critical understanding gained from a religious perspective has been set aside, but this has come at
a high cost. As Ryken so aptly puts it, “Western culture has emphasized the person as worker
(the Reformation tradition and Marx) and the person as thinker (Aquinas and Descartes). And the
result in the words of Harvey Cox is that 'man's celebrative and imaginative faculties have
atrophied. . . . His shrunken psyche is just as much a victim of industrialization as were the bend
bodies of those luckless children who were once confined to English factories from dawn to
dusk'" (Ryken 19). If we accept the secularization of literary studies, we have nothing to balance
our postmodern angst. When the metaphysical needs of man or woman are removed, only
impoverishment of spirit is left. Criticism is left vaporous. The sense of mystery vanishes. In the
words of Flannery O’Connor “[i]t is the business of fiction to embody mystery . . . , and mystery
is a great embarrassment to the modern mind” (124).The mystery of which O’Connor speaks is
that of our existential condition. Literature in the hands of a talented artist reveals that central
mystery. Leaving out expressions of compassion, piety, grace, morality, and other metaphysical
concerns, modern literary criticism has lost its heart.
The secularization of the religious in English literature began in Early Modern England,
with King Henry VIII’s edict, declaring a separation from papal authority and the creation of a
new Church of England. David Cressy and Lori Anne Ferrell explain that during this period
religion “permeated every aspect of English society. . . . Public and private affairs alike were
deeply infused by religion” (1). In studying the literature of the time, they found that “many of
[the] texts reveal diametrically opposed impulses: the search for a faith that convinced the
intellect, and for a religion that satisfied the heart” (2). While we may not agree that the two
impulses (faith and intellect) are antithetical, it is clear that the Early Modern citizens were a
staunchly religious body, and they viewed literature and life from within a metaphysical context.
This viewpoint changed dramatically in the nineteenth century when worldviews shifted
toward a naturalistic outlook. The “scientific method” became the preeminent way of knowing
about our world, replacing religion as the receptacle of truth. Old ways of looking at literature
gave way to modern literary theory. Being able to deconstruct a text using scientific, even
esoteric, methodologies was seen as the pinnacle of scholarly pursuits. The Judeo-Christian ethos
was replaced with a secular one. As George Marsden explains, it is not that academia is now
“hostile to religion; but the norm for people to be fully accepted in academic culture is to act as
though their religious beliefs had nothing to do with education. Scholars are expected to analyze
subjects such as the nature of reality, beauty, truth, morality, the just society, the individual, and
the community [all topics discussed in literature classes today] as though deeply held religious
beliefs had no relevance to such topics” (23-24). How does this secularization operate in a
literature classroom today? John C. Green gives an excellent example:
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If a professor talks about studying something from a Marxist point of view, others
might disagree but not dismiss the notion. But if a professor proposed to study
something from a Catholic or Protestant point of view, it would be treated like
proposing something from a Martian point of view (qtd. in Marsden 7).
The epistemological value of religious convictions in the study of literature has been dismissed.
Other viewpoints, such as feminism, Marxism, and Freudian analysis, are found to be more
reliable in the pursuit of truth. We have, in Marsden’s words, reached a point where “in the name
of multiculturalism we have silenced some of our major sub-cultures” (32).
Problems arise, however, when the soul of literature is taken out, replaced by the
hegemony of moral relativism. Since no universal ethical or moral boundaries exist, the catch
phrase “what’s true for you” becomes the default guideline by which we evaluate a text. In other
words, anything goes as long as a viewpoint is secular. Never one to mince words, C.S. Lewis
aptly describes this problem of secularization in his The Abolition of Man or Reflections on
Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools.i In
this, Lewis attempted to “tackle nothing less than the hegemony of relativism in modern western
culture.” He found that this “subjectivism was most apparent and dangerous in epistemology”
(Travers 109). Lewis quotes Confucius in his epigraph: “The Master said, He who sets to work
on a different stand destroys the whole fabric.” In other words, to destroy man’s traditional
values results in the abolition of man.
Lewis begins by analyzing an English grammar book popular in England during his time.
He decries the author’s “debunking” of truth and emphasis on indoctrination. Lewis posits that
this type of pedagogy teaches “nothing about letters” (the actual subject of the textbook) and
instead cuts out the soul of the child “long before he is old enough to choose.” Lewis calls this
the work of the “amateur philosopher where [we] expected the work of professional
grammarians” (23). In other words, what children are being taught is a philosophical and ethical
outlook on life that has replaced universal moral law with subjective, false sentiments. Lewis
goes on to explain that, until modern history, there was an understanding amongst humanity that
“certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and
the kind of things we are” (29). It is within this framework wherein most children were educated
and laws were created. Ethics demanded a universal code, a law, an order, and this was taught in
schools. However, this has no longer become the case: “Where the old initiated, the new merely
‘conditions’” (32). Thus, relativism found its foothold. Lewis found this new type of education
worrisome and indoctrinating.
Lewis cites Plato in his Republic wherein Plato offers that “Reason [the head] in man
must rule the mere appetites [the belly] by means of the ‘spirited element’ [the chest]” (34).
From Lewis’s viewpoint, Western civilization, as evidenced in the modern English grammar
book, has been pushed outside of the Greek philosopher’s framework. In Lewis’s words, they
“remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests [spirit/soul] and
expect of them virtue and enterprise” (35). The result— a purely subjective morality.
Lewis succinctly states the goal of such a warped teaching of literature: “[T]he whole
purpose of [the pedagogue's grammar] book is so to condition the young reader that he will share
their approval” (40). The relativism taught is only the subjective viewpoint of those in power, of
those teaching such ideologies to the young. In other words, the strict skepticism of values, in
particular traditional ones, is only surface level; it is only to be used on other people’s values and
not one’s own: “A great many of those who ‘debunk’ traditional . . . values have in the
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background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process.
They claim to be cutting away the parasitic growth of emotion, religious sanction, and inherited
taboos, in order that ‘real’ or ‘basic’ values may emerge” (42).ii This debunking gives way to the
secularization of literary studies.
Referring to the new grammar lessons, Lewis sums up, “The Innovator attacks traditional
values (what he calls the Tao) in defense of what he at first supposes to be (in some special
sense) ‘rational’ or ‘biological’ values” (53-54). Lewis defines the Tao as “Natural Law,
Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes” and argues
that it is not one among many systems of truth or systems of value: it is the only source of all
value judgments (56)iii. Historically, education through literature endeavored to produce the kind
of student prescribed by the Tao. This was a universal norm espoused by traditional educators.
Contrarily, moral relativists now produce values that are only “natural phenomena” and
judgments that are conditioned (74). The problem is this: “Nature, untrammeled by values, rules
the conditioners and, through them, all humanity. . . .” (80). This anti-metaphysical way of
evaluating literature takes the beauty away: “The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh
and measure them: the soul does not become Nature till we can psycho-analyse her” (83). The
resultant exclusion of the religious viewpoint isn’t so much the discrimination against a religious
scholarly approach (although that might be the case), but that religion’s approach is seen as less
intellectual. Faith-informed scholarship is deemed intrinsically inferior.
What would literary criticism and the teaching of literature look like if a religious
viewpoint was acknowledged? First, it would not mean the favoring of one author over another
due to his/her religious perspective, the interpreting of historic literature through God’s
providential intervention, or the quoting of scripture in class. It would not be proselytizing.
Rather, it would mean making a place for the Judeo-Christian or religious scholar—to allow that
worldview to have equal standing among others. This would not mean that scholars with a
religious perspective should churn out sentimental gibberish. They should adhere to the common
standards of literary criticism and pedagogical practices. This also means that no professor
should use his or her position as a religious soap box. Fairness and tolerance of opinions would
still be expected. What we are arguing for, then, is the inclusion of a religious voice and of the
value of that presence. The silencing of any one worldview has serious implications, particularly
when that view is one that has been considered traditionally of value. T.S. Eliot states, “The
whole of modern literature is corrupted by what I call Secularism, that it is simply unaware of,
simply cannot understand the meaning of, the primacy of the supernatural over the natural life: of
something which I assume to be our primary concern” (28). It is in the belief of a metaphysical
world, or at least the acknowledgement of the possibility of one, wherein we can meet the needs
of the twenty-first century student of literature and the field of contemporary literary criticism.
Debbie Ostorga — Moral Development of College Students
The moral development of its students was one of the chief purposes of the colonial
college. Thelin states that in colonial colleges “all learning ultimately was to coalesce into the
values and actions of a Christian gentlemen” (Thelin 24). However, despite the fact that moral
development was central to its purpose. Thelin asserts that “it is not evident that the values
espoused by the Puritan college builders were especially humane or tolerant…college founders
were impatient or at best indifferent to disagreements within Congregationalism and
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Presbyterianism, and they were downright hostile toward Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism”
(29).
Families who sent their sons to college where very concerned about their moral training
and believed that colleges should provide that training. Thelin states that “by the eighteenth
century the college had supplemented and perhaps replaced the family as the transmitter of social
lessons” (25). Around the turn of the twentieth century many institutions U.S. higher education
began to abandon their religious affiliations. Furthermore, the history of higher education reveals
that, concurrently, moral development went from the center of university (its classrooms) to the
margins (the extracurricular) (Marsden; Reuben). Many scholars have noted that the growing
lack of moral development was a result of the secularization of the university. Today most
universities espouse the importance of developing a student’s moral character; however
universities are missing what the colonial colleges had, a theistically founded morality.
Colonial colleges were founded by various Christian denominations, as universities had
been since medieval times. They educated only 1% of the population (Thelin 20). The small
minority that attended colonial colleges are described by Thelin as “aristocrats, who love liberty
and hate equality.” For most, concerns about moral training were a priority. Theological training
was not, however, the main mission of these colleges according to Thelin; colonial colleges did
not even award degrees in divinity (27). Thelin states that governors in various colonies hoped
“that college alumni who became clergy would provide an antidote to the threat of uneducated or
‘unlettered’ revivalist preachers…[governors] were concerned that ‘enthusiasm’ not reasoned
belief would come to dominate colonial religion and society” (28). Despite its religious
underpinnings, by the end of the nineteenth century classes in religious and moral philosophy
disappeared from the curriculum and courses devoted to religion and morality declined (Reuben
115).
This decline concerned many university leaders who began to struggle with ways to
develop the student’s moral character. William Adams Brown, who was a provost at Yale in the
early twentieth century cites the importance of curricular cohesion and asserts that “Christian
faith provides to bring unity and consistency into man’s thought of the universe” (qtd. in
Longfield 160).
Some universities attempted to maintain the unity of the curriculum by going back to the
classical liberal education model (Reuben 236). They believed that free and open inquiry lead to
specialized disciplines, which in their view lacked any overarching themes or connections to one
another (237). However, the attempts to address the lack of curricular unity and
overspecialization failed. Reuben states “the aims of curricular reforms as twofold: to restore
unity and moral purpose to college education and to promote a higher level of scholarship among
undergraduates” (238). A liberal arts curriculum, they believed, would be best suited to develop
a student moral character. However, the faculty opposed this change in curricular offerings.
Reuben asserts “after failing to create a modern source of moral training, faculty were more
willing to abandon the principle of unity than to stray too far from the principle of freedom and
the practice of specialized scholarship” (243). In the end curricular reforms failed in creating a
common course of study which was unifying and cultivated morality.
The lack of religious traditions and unity at the turn of the twentieth century coupled with
the expansion of higher education was a catalyst for new universities to create the “collegiate
way” or “college life” which was to be the new unifying factor (255). Some of the markers of
college life were the development of college sports, college colors, college mascots, college
hymns. These aspects of college life began to make the schools unique from one another. The
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replacement of religious traditions with college traditions at the turn of the century reflects the
secularization of U.S. universities. It was believed that group identity could serve as the most
effective moral influence on students. Rueben asserts that at that time morality became identified
with behavior rather than belief (268). Thelin asserts that “the elaborate extracurricular of
athletics teams and musical groups later associated with the ‘collegiate way’ were not part of the
true colonial colleges” (Thelin 22). Simultaneously, student affairs professionals were added to
the university workforce. Reuben asserts “commitment to student services reflected their
growing belief that the moral value of a university education resided in the community life of
students, not in their formal education” (Reuben 225). Student affairs were responsible for
upholding the school standards, overseeing the extracurricular and moral development of
students. Currently, the function of student affairs professionals is essentially the same as it was
then. There is a clear distinction between student and academic affairs. Student affairs
professionals deal with issues of student misconduct ranging from academic dishonesty to sexual
assault. For example, most campuses have established protocols to deal with a breach in
university standards such as academic dishonesty.
Moral development, whether influenced by secular values or theistic values, is always
reflective of what is socially acceptable during a particular time period. The current issue of New
Directions for Higher Education is entitled “Facilitating the moral growth of college students”.
In this issue student affair professionals write about ways to promote student moral development.
Stewart asserts that “engaging in difficult dialogues and practicing patience, compassion and
forgiveness assist with the continual development of moral maturity” (Stewart 70). One could
argue that these principles of patience, compassion, and forgiveness come out of Christianity.
One could also argue that the lack of theistic based morality may limit the way in which students
develop moral character.
The debate in higher education about the importance of character and moral development
is still important. Nicgorski asserts that “moral education is the most important part, the very
substance, of socialization” (Nicgorski 21). Early college leaders were also concerned with this;
they believed they had a moral mission which was the wellbeing of society (166). The difference
is that today, many in the academy believe that morality based on science is more authoritative
than morality based on religion (171). Habermas warns of the ill that may result in the political
sphere when religion and reason are not in conversation with one another. This concern also
applies to universities. Habermas implies that people in the post-modern world miss the morality
that comes with theological insight. Habermas states that “religious utterances can make a
meaningful contribution of clarifying controversial questions of principle” (Habermas, “An
Awareness” 22). University leaders and others in the academy who are dismissive of religiously
founded values fail to recognize the value that these insights can bring to a conversation.
Colonial colleges started off with a theistically based morality. The very mission of those
schools was reflected in this. However, U.S. colleges went through a period of expansion and
transition at the end of the nineteenth century. During this transition moral training was moved to
the margins. Now the issue is whether universities, by marginalizing morality and a Christian
worldview, has lost their ability to develop a student’s moral character? Will they learn from
previous university leaders; leaders who recognized that the loss of a theistically founded
morality is not only a disservice to the student’s moral growth but also to the strength of the
society which will eventually be led by those same students?
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Nathan Greeley — The Dependence of Morality upon Theism
The notion of a necessary relationship between theism and morality is a hotly contested
one today. Whereas in the not so distant past, it was thought that a necessary relationship
between the two was quite self-evident, this consensus has dramatically eroded over the past two
centuries. Most philosophers in our contemporary world consider the view that morality’s
possession of sense and intelligibility is inconceivable without a transcendent underpinning to be
no more than a relic of a past age. The sense or meaning of morality is now attributed to any
number of mundane and empirical realities, most having to do with the social utility of various
norms and values. It will be the purpose of this section to argue that morality requires a
definition that makes the acts of human beings either objectively moral or immoral, and that the
only means of securing such a definition is to argue that the moral order is established by the
ultimate authority, namely God.
In Western thought, the disassociation of theism and morality stems from Enlightenment
criticisms, arguments that made belief in God seem to be an impossibility. These skeptical
arguments, found in the writings of Hume, Voltaire, Lessing, and others, are now part of our
common cultural inheritance, and need not be rehearsed here. What is significant for the
purposes of this essay is that for many philosophers and ethicists, these arguments dictated
finding a naturalistic basis for the sense and meaning of morality as the conceptions of morality
derived from theistic natural law or divine command were deemed incredible and untenable.
Most modern thinkers, regardless of their less than enthusiastic regard for naturalistic ethical
conceptions, have arrived at the conclusion that dictates that nothing better is available, and
hence that theistic critiques of naturalistic ethics, even when acute and incisive, cannot be taken
too seriously. Due to this oftentimes happy resignation, the paradigm shift to naturalistic ethics
is, in many quarters, today a fait accompli. Yet the rethinking of the basis of morality found in
naturalistic ethics raises some important questions that should not be too hastily brushed aside. It
is important, I would argue, that we reach a high degree of clarity with respect to what the
differences are between theistic and naturalistic conceptions of morality. Only then can it
become fully evident whether a naturalistic ethics is truly a worthy substitute for theistic
morality. It is my belief that naturalistic morality is unacceptable as a substitute, precisely
because the objectivity of morality, so essential to the very definition of morality, goes missing
on a naturalistic account. This should demand that theism be considered or reconsidered, in spite
of any prima facie difficulties that such a position entails.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to talk about a specific issue that almost
everyone agrees is intimately bound up with moral questions. The issue is human rights, a notion
that I assume the majority of people in the modern West regard as a foundational idea in our
culture. I pose the following question: can a naturalistic morality fund things like human rights
and the dignity of persons in a way comparable to a morality rooted in theism? I will argue that it
cannot, and as a result, I recommend that we consider finding a place for theistic morality if we
wish to maintain these conceptions, such as human rights, in anything other than a pro forma
fashion.
Following Mark D. Linville, in his essay “The Moral Argument,” I take it as a principle
of theistic morality that the essential reason why some acts are considered immoral is that they
violate the intrinsic rights and dignity of human persons (Linville 442-446). From a theistic
viewpoint, God is the objective provider and guarantor of the rights and dignities that all
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individuals possess. The reason why murdering, raping, or abusing other persons is morally
wrong is that these acts violate the inalienable value and rights of persons, rights inherent simply
by virtue of persons being created as beings possessed of intrinsic worth and dignity. God creates
persons, i.e., rational and moral creatures who, like God himself, have their own ends and must
not simply be regarded by other persons as resources or instruments. To do so would be to
violate their nature qua persons, as people whose lives and ability to make choices and pursue
goals are God’s gifts (444-445).
That being said, the question that should next be raised is whether a like conception of
persons is available to the committed naturalist. On the assumption that the universe is for all
intents and purposes equivalent to a cosmic accident, without any objective purpose or value, the
question becomes how objective purpose and value can ever emerge at any stage of its
development. As Linville states, “the naturalist’s obstacles in accounting for the dignity of
persons are at least threefold, and they are interlocked: how to derive the personal from the
impersonal, how to derive values from a previously valueless universe, and how to unite the
personal and the valuable with the result of a coherent and plausible notion of personal dignity”
(443). We have already stated how theism manages to do this: for theism the personal and the
valuable are not things that inexplicably emerge from a universe lacking these qualities, but
rather they are there from the beginning, and their being united is a result of their having God as
their ground, source, and highest exemplar. The moral order is not something inexplicable that is
added on to the physical order, but a part of a total order that has been present in God’s person
and providence from the beginning. The dignity of human persons is thus extant from the
beginning, existing in the person of God, from whom the dignity of all other persons is derived
as a gift.
Stated like this, it may seem quite evident that the conception of persons as explained by
theism is logically unobtainable by any naturalistic conception of ethics. I believe that such
immediate impressions are substantially representative of the reality of the matter. Naturalism is
forced to be reductionist about things like personality and value, because they imagine a nascent
universe bereft of these things. As a result, notions like intrinsic rights and dignity must, on pain
of being inconsistent, be dismissed or redefined in some other way. But to do either is to
acknowledge that they don’t really exist, but are merely social constructions.
Do we wish to think that human rights are social constructions? That is the unavoidable
question with which we are faced. Thomas Jefferson, in The Declaration of Independence, is
quite clear that human rights are natural rights, and that natural rights are God-given rights. In
contrast, we find today the dominating viewpoint of utilitarianism; it forms the de rigeur ethics
for modern atheism. What did Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, have to say about
human rights? He states that “there are no such things as natural rights—no such things as rights
anterior to the establishment of government—no such things as natural rights opposed to, in
contradistinction to, legal [rights]” (Bentham 500). In Bentham’s view, rights are the result of
contingent social arrangements, and do not precede them. According to Bentham, an act is wrong
not because it violates someone’s intrinsic or natural rights (e.g. the right of human beings at all
times and in all places not to be murdered or raped) but only because the extant social order is
such that deeds like murder and rape have been deemed violations of the social contract. In other
words, the only thing that makes my murdering someone wrong is that the society that I live in
has determined to consider it so. Were my society to decide differently about what murder is or
what it consists of, then the definition of rights would have to be reinterpreted. Perhaps on the
new interpretation, six million Jews would have no rights.
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For anyone who insists upon an intrinsic conception of human rights, which would see
violations of these natural rights as stemming directly from the way that people are themselves
wronged by such violations, and which would eschew any understanding of human rights as
having a merely pragmatic or contingent origin, it is evident that utilitarianism, in spite of its
popularity, is unacceptable. For people who find themselves so disposed, theism, as the ground
of a non-contingent moral order that establishes intrinsic value for all human persons, is the only
real alternative, one that demands consideration by anyone who has an interest in preserving a
conception of human rights and dignity as inherent in all human persons, regardless of
circumstances or vicissitudes of history.
I will now sum up what I take to be the upshot of this section. Assuming that order in
nature is necessary for the objectivity of empirical assertions, I see no reason not to think that a
principle of order is similarly fundamental for the objectivity of all assertions. Truth, since the
time of the Greeks, has been understood to be the correspondence of an assertion with reality. If
there is no reality to which the assertion can correspond, then the basis of that objectivity is
unfounded. All judgments that do not correspond to reality are by definition false. And so if there
is no objective moral order to which moral assertions correspond, then no moral assertion can
possibly be true—all will be opinion, statements of preference no different than those that apply
to any other arena of subjective taste. There may still be prescriptions about what one should do
(indeed all naturalistic moral theories have prescriptions) but these will not in fact be moral
assertions, precisely because there are no moral facts to which they can correspond. Without a
theistic foundation, we are left with something other than, and less than, morality; namely the
forced and contractual agreement among persons to behave in certain ways with respect to one
another. The objective wrongness of actions no longer exists. What is “wrong” with murder, or
rape, is that the contract is breeched, not that the act of murder or rape is committed. And even
the breech of said contract is only “wrong” because the power exists to enforce it.
It is very important in discussions of morality to be extremely frank about the
consequences of what happens when theistic morality goes missing. Can a naturalistic ethics
accomplish what a conception of morality tied to theism can achieve? No. Can it provide a
meaning for morality as rich and robust as can be provided theistic ethics? No. Is it forced to
argue that morality is simply a way that contingent power relations between groups and
individuals are managed and negotiated? Yes. Does morality then become something other than
morality under such conditions? Yes. Does it, if understood as an unbending guide to timelessly
right action, go missing? Yes. As I believe has been demonstrated in this section, it is quite easy
to illuminate the shape that morality finds itself in without God. That shape, unfortunately, is no
shape at all.
Conclusion
The previous four sections have attempted to show, in various ways, how secularism has
impacted and continues to impact our culture. The uniform message has been that when religion
disappears or is severely weakened in its influence, society changes for the worse in many unembraceable ways. It has been argued that all problems are at bottom moral and religious
problems. This means that not only are political, social, pedagogical, and economic problems are
at root moral and religious problems, but that the solution to these putatively “secular” problems
will only be available to those who believe in moral and religious norms. Absent of transcendent
principles, the modern West is in a sorry state, rootless, wandering, unsure of what it is, what it
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wants, what it should permit, and what it stands for. Without moral and religious norms, the
result is cultural oblivion, for morality and religion alone give to a culture its most precious
attribute, namely its memory of its own identity.
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Notes
1This book was originally published in 1947 from three Riddell Memorial lectures which Lewis
gave on February 24-26, 1943 at the University of Durham. Lewis and his brother traveled
during the middle of World War II to deliver the orations. This was the fifteenth lecture given as
part of the Riddell series. They were established to honor the memory of Sir John Walter
Buchanan-Riddell and usually discussed the “decline in modern times of belief in an objective
natural law and a correspondence epistemology” (Travers 108).
2 Lewis lists a few examples from the English textbook that are surreptitiously taught by the
authors as moral approvals and disapprovals under the guise of a grammar lesson: Disapprovals:
. . . ‘To call a man a coward tell us really nothing about what he does. . . .’ Feelings about a
country or empire are feelings ‘about nothing in particular. . . .’ Approvals: Those who prefer the
arts of peace to the arts of war (it is not said in what circumstances) are such that ‘we may want
to call them ‘wise men. . . .’ ‘Contact with the ideas of other people is, as we know, healthy.’
(Abolition 41)
3 Lewis argues against moral relativism and shows that throughout time, people have held to a
universal moral law. He is not arguing necessarily for a Judeo-Christian or narrowly Christian
moral code; instead, it is a moral code (the “Tao”) inherent in all human beings. He augments
this argument with evidence in his appendix, which lists many examples of Natural Law and uses
many ancient traditions to prove his point of a universal law. The titles themselves display the
types of truths he argues are part of the Natural Law or Tao as he calls it: “The Law of General
Beneficence,” “The Law of Special Beneficence,” “Duties to Parents, Elders, Ancestors,”
“Duties to Children and Posterity,” “The Law of Justice,” The Law of Good Faith and Veracity,”
“The Law of Mercy,” and “The Law of Magnanimity.” For example, in the first part of the
appendix, he cites several ancient sources who believe murder is wrong and the murderer evil-Ancient Jewish, Hindu, Babylonian, Ancient Chinese, Ancient Egyptian, Old Norse, and so on
(Abolition 97-100).
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